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Abstract:  
Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) is an automatic identification method, relying on storing 
and remotely retrieving data using devices called RFID tags or transponders. An RFID tag is an 
object that can be applied to or incorporated into a product, animal, or person for the purpose of 
identification using radio waves. These RFID tags are heavily constrained in computational and 
storage capabilities, and raise numerous privacy concerns in everyday life due to their 
vulnerability to different attacks. Both forward security and backward security are required to 
maintain the privacy of a tag i.e., exposure of a tag's secret key should not reveal the past or 
future secret keys of the tag. We envisage the need for a formal model for backward security for 
RFID protocol designs in shared key settings, since the RFID tags are too resource-constrained 
to support public key settings. However, there has not been much research on backward security 
for shared key environment since Serge Vaudenay in his Asiacrypt 2007 paper showed that 
perfect backward security is impossible to achieve without public key settings. We propose* a 
Key-Insulated Mutual Authentication Protocol for shared key environment, KIMAP, which 
minimizes the damage caused by secret key exposure using insulated keys. Even if a tag's secret 
key is exposed during an authentication session, forward security and `restricted' backward 
security of the tag are preserved under our assumptions. The notion of `restricted' backward 
security is that the adversary misses the protocol transcripts which are needed to update the 
compromised secret key. Although our definition does not capture perfect backward security, it 
is still suitable for effective implementation as the tags are highly mobile in practice. We also 
provide a formal security model of KIMAP. Our scheme is more efficient than previous 
proposals from the viewpoint of computational requirements.  
 
KeyWords: Mutual Authentication, Privacy, Restricted Backward Security, Indistinguishability, 
Forward Security 
*A preliminary version of this work appeared at the Sixth Workshop on Secure Network 
Protocols- NPSec, IEEE (2010) 
1 Introduction 
 
Passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags used in stores and industries are getting ubiquitous 
nowadays. These RFID tags are heavily constrained in computational and storage capabilities, and this 
has made the RFID tags vulnerable to different attacks. This vulnerability raises numerous privacy 
concerns in everyday life. One of the main issues of RFID security and privacy has to do with 
malicious tracking of RFID-equipped objects. While tracking RFID tags is typically one of the key 
features and goals of a legitimate RFID system, unauthorized tracking of RFID tags is viewed as a 
major privacy threat. Both forward and backward securities are required to maintain the privacy of the 
tag. Forward security means that even if the adversary acquires the secret data stored in a tag, the 
tag cannot be traced back using previously known messages [2, 12]. Backward security means the 
opposite, i.e., even if the adversary acquires the secret data stored in a tag, the tag cannot be traced 
using subsequently known messages. In other words, exposure of a tag's secret should not reveal any 
secret information regarding the past or the future of the tag. Moreover, indistinguishability means 
that the values emitted by one tag should not be distinguishable from the values emitted by other 
tags [12, 19]. 
 
1.1 Related Work 
 
Many privacy-preserving mutual RFID authentication schemes have been proposed in recent years [1, 
6, 7, 9, 14, 15, 26, 18, 24, 34]. MSW (Molner,Soppera,Wagner) protocols [18] use a hierarchical tree-
based keying to allow tag identification/authentication. But MSW protocols have a security aw 
whereby an adversary who compromises one tag is able to track/identify other tags that belong to 
the same families (tree branches) as the compromised tag [1]. Hash-based Access Control (HAC), as 
defined by [34], is a scheme which involves locking a tag using a one-way hash function. The scheme 
allows a tag to be tracked, because the same secret key is used repeatedly [7]. An authentication 
protocol for RFID from EPCGlobal Class-1 Gen-2 standards was introduced by [7]. Both the 
authentication key and the access key are updated after a successful session in order to provide 
forward security. However, [26] showed that [7] is not backward and forward-secure, because an 
attacker that compromises a tag can identify a tag's past interactions from the previous 
communications and the fixed EPC of the tag, and can also read the tag's future transactions. 
Another lightweight mutual RFID authentication was proposed by [15] which focused mainly on 
achieving indistinguishability and forward security features. However, this protocol does not support 
backward security, neither did it came up with any formal definition of indistinguishability or forward 
security. There are also some other privacy-preserving RFID protocols that address untraceability and 
forward security [6, 9, 24]. However, all these protocols have the same drawback, that is, they cannot 
provide backward security. LK and SM schemes [14, 26] have recently described RFID authentication 
schemes satisfying both forward and backward security. However, [26] has been shown to be 
vulnerable to an attack where an adversary breaks the forward security [25]. The scheme proposed in 
[14] cannot provide backward security if the current secret key is compromised [20]. Again, [16] 
proposed an RFID authentication protocol, and defined a formal model for backward security 
assuming that a part of the secret key is leaked only – not the whole secret key. In other words, it is 
assumed that for backward security, the time available to the adversary is limited, because in most 
cases, output of RFID tag is valid only during a certain time period. It follows that the adversary can 
obtain a limited amount of leaked information from side-channel attack that leads to partial leakage 
of the secret key in the tag. Such an assumption of partial leakage is not realistic in practice for RFID 
tags, since there can be various strong attacking devices that can fully compromise the whole secret 
key of a resource constrained RFID tag. Backward security has also been studied in the mutual 
authentication protocol proposed by [36] assuming that the adversary can passively attack the 
protocol transcript. The notion of backward security in that work is such that the secret key and the 
tag-specific id cannot be compromised by an adversary. In other words, an adversary is not allowed 
to break in to the tag's memory. That means, some kind of tamper-resistance has to be assumed for 
the tag. Such a restriction is not practical since today's attacking devices are strong enough to attack 
a tag's memory and today's low cost tags are not tamper-resistant. 
 
Key Insulated Public Key Cryptosystem: In Key Insulated Public Key Cryptosystem [10], a ‘master 
secret’ key SK* is stored in a device which is physically secure and hence resistant to compromise. All 
decryption, however, is done on an insecure device for which key exposure is expected to be a 
problem. 
The lifetime of the protocol is divided into distinct periods 1,…,N. At the beginning of each period, 
the user interacts with the secure device to derive a temporary secret key which will be used to 
decrypt messages sent during that period; we denote by SKi the temporary key for period i. 
Ciphertexts are now labeled with the time period during which they were encrypted. The insecure 
device, which does all actual decryption, is vulnerable to repeated key exposures. The goal is to 
minimize the effect such compromises will have. The notion of security is that the adversary will be 
unable to determine any information about messages sent during all time periods other than that in 
which a compromise occurred. However, this approach is not suitable for RFID environment. RFID 
tags do not have the capability to communicate with the server by themselves, and do not have the 
resources for computing public key encryption which requires high computation ability. Low-cost 
RFID tags usually are capable of performing only the hash function, random number generation and 
bitwise XOR operations. Therefore, we need to come up with a key-insulated mechanism that works 
for RFID environment. 
 
Key Insulation in Public-Channel: In [3], Bellare et al. show that it is impossible to achieve public-
channel key insulated security in the face of an active adversary (who has full control of the channel). 
That is, in a model which allows an interactive channel-update protocol and evolving channel-security 
keys, an active adversary can always succeed in breaking the scheme. The reason is that after the 
adversary breaks in, it obtains the user's channel-security key and can thus impersonate the user. 
Authentication (such as an authenticated session key exchange) does not prevent this, since the 
adversary acquires all the user's credentials via the break-in. This negative result is particularly strong 
because their public-channel key insulated model is as generous as one can get, while keeping the 
spirit of key insulation. Bellare et al. show that public-channel key insulated protocol is possible 
against an adversary that is allowed only a passive attack on the communication channel. (Meaning it 
can eavesdrop.) This result is significant because, it shows that key insulation is at least possible over 
a channel where the adversary may be able to eavesdrop but finds it hard to inject or corrupt 
transmissions. However, assuming passive adversary in case of RFID is not practical, as it is easy for 
an adversary to break into a tag's memory. We thus need to make a different assumption that is 
practical for RFID environment, where the adversary is active but has limited effect after key-
compromise due to the use of key-insulation mechanism. 
 
1.2 Motivation: 
 
Since the adversary is able to trace the target tag at least during the authentication immediately 
following compromise of the tag secret, perfect backward security makes no sense. Therefore, a 
minimum restriction should be imposed to achieve backward security, such that the adversary misses 
the necessary protocol transcripts to update the compromised key. Although this assumption for 
backward security is true for certain classes of privacy-preserving RFID protocols (i.e., for shared key 
environment), it is clearly not true for some other cases. For instance, Vaudenay shows an RFID 
protocol based on public-key cryptography that is resistant to this attack [30]. The same result was 
shown by [21] for mutual authentication protocols. However, our notion of backward security is true 
for privacy-preserving RFID protocols based on shared secrets that are updated on each interaction 
between tag and reader, which is the focus of this paper. Backward security is thus harder to achieve 
than forward security in general, particularly under the very constrained environment of RFID tags. 
However, backward security is never less important than forward security in RFID systems. In the case 
of target tracing, it suffices to somehow steal the tag secret of a target and collect interaction 
messages to trace the future behaviors of the particular target. Without backward security, this kind 
of target tracing is trivial. In the case of supply chain management systems, even a catastrophic 
scenario may take place without backward security: if tag secrets are leaked at some point of tag 
deployment or during their time in the environment, then all such tags can be traced afterwards. We 
thus envisage the need for a formal model for backward security in RFID protocol designs (even if 
not perfect) in addition to the well-recognized forward security. 
 
 
1.3 Our Contribution 
 
We propose KIMAP, a privacy-preserving Key Insulated Mutual RFID Authentication Protocol for 
shared key environment which provides both forward and `restricted' backward security through key 
insulation. Even if a tag's secret key is exposed during an authentication session, forward security and 
`restricted' backward security of the tag are preserved under our assumptions. The notion of 
`restricted' backward security is that the adversary misses the protocol transcripts needed to update 
the compromised secret key. The protocol also provides indistinguishability between the responses of 
tags in order to provide privacy of a tag. We also provide a formal security model to design our 
privacy-preserving protocol. Our assumptions for indistinguishability and forward/restricted backward 
security are similar to the assumptions made in previous work. 
 
Organization of the Paper: The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents 
the notations, assumptions, the protocol model, and the security definitions. Section 3 describes the 
protocol. Next, our scheme is evaluated in Section 4 based on a security analysis and a comparison 
with previous work. Section 5 includes concluding remarks. 
 
2 Preliminary 
 
2.1 Notations 
 
Table 1 includes the notations used in the protocol description: 
 
 
2.2 Assumptions 
 
A tag T is not tamper-resistant. Initially, it stores the secret key k1 which is updated after each 
authentication session. All communication between a server and a reader is assumed to be over a 
private and authentic channel. In this paper, we consider Reader and Server as a single entity. 
Therefore, we use the terms ‘Server' or ‘S' interchangeably in the text. The adversary cannot 
compromise the server. The tag is assumed to be vulnerable to repeated key exposures; specifically, 
we assume that up to t<N periods can be compromised. Our goal is to minimize the effect such 
compromises will have. When a secret key is exposed, an adversary will be able to trace the tag for 
period i until the next single secure authentication session. Our notion of security is that this is the 
best an adversary can do. In particular, the adversary will be unable to trace a tag for any of the 
subsequent periods. It is assumed that hash and PRNG take the same amount of execution time. 
Splitting and concatenation operations take negligible amounts of time. 
 
Assumption 1 
A one-way hash function H can map an input x to an output of fixed length λ, which is called hash 
value h: h = H(x). One-way hash function H has the following property: 
- Given a hash value h, it is computationally infeasible to find the input x such that H(x) = h 
Assumption 2 
Let z = H (x,y), where H is a one-way hash function. Given z and x, it is computationally infeasible to 
find y. 
 
Remark 1: The one-time pad is a simple, classical form of encryption (See, [17] for discussion). Briefly 
stated, if two parties share a secret onetime pad p, for example a random bit string, then one party 
may transmit a message m secretly to the other via the ciphertext p  m, where   denotes the XOR 
operation. It is well known that this form of encryption provides unconditional security. We use one-
time pad, as it requires only the lightweight computational process of XORing. 
 
2.3 An Overview of KIMAP 
 
We make some slight twists to the original idea of key-insulation to design our protocol. RFID tags 
do not have the capability to communicate with the server by themselves, and do not have the 
resources for computing public key encryption, which requires high computation ability. Therefore, in 
our protocol, both the server and the tag use symmetric key encryption. We use only the hash 
function, random number generation and bitwise XOR operations. Our protocol uses two different 
values for server authentication by tag, and tag authentication by server. For server authentication, a 
part of the tag's secret key is used. The session key sk is used to authenticate the tag. To be precise, 
part of the tag's secret key is used to authenticate a valid server. Another part of the tag's secret key 
is used along with a part of a random number sent by the server to generate sk. The server 
generates this partial key from the master key (SK*) stored in its memory. A tag's secret key is 
updated during each time period. Thus, during a particular time period i, a tag computes the session 
key from the secret value stored in its memory and the partial secret key sent by the server by using 
simple XOR and hash functions. Both the tag authentication key (session key sk and tag secret key k 
are different in each session. They both are randomized and refreshed using the fresh values 
(generated from master secret SK*) sent by the legitimate server in each session. We define 
indistinguishability, forward and backward security. While in general, backward security means that all 
the future sessions will be secure if the current secret is exposed; restricted backward security for 
RFID says that the adversary must miss the necessary protocol transcripts to update the compromised 
key. In KIMAP, a tag computes a session secret key from a random value chosen by the server. This 
session secret key sk is used by the server to authenticate the tag. Then the server generates a 
message authentication value by using a part of the tag's secret key. The tag authenticates the server 
by verifying its value. The use of two different values to authenticate the tag and server ensures the 
backward and forward security of the tag. In other words, even if the sk or the tag secret key is 
exposed during an authentication session i, a tag's privacy is guaranteed for all other past time 
periods (forward security). All the future time periods are secure as well, assuming that the adversary 
misses the necessary protocol transcripts to update the compromised key (restricted backward 
security). 
 
2.4 The Model 
 
We design the model following the model proposed in [10]. However, our model is slightly different 
than that in [10]. We assume a fixed, polynomial-size tag set TS = {T1,…,Tn}, and a server ‘Server' as 
the elements of an RFID system. A Server has information for TS's authentication such as tag's secret 
key, master key, etc. Before the protocol is run for the first time, an initialization phase occurs in both 
T land Server, where l = 1,..,n. That is, each Tl ϵ TS runs an algorithm G to generate the secret key kl, 
and Server also saves these values in a database field. A key-updating authentication scheme is a 5-
tuple of poly-time algorithms (G, U*, S, U, Auth(AuthT/AuthS) such that: 
 
G, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 
1
λ
, and the total number of tags n. It returns a master key SK*, and an initial shared key    for each 
tag. 
U*, the partial key generation algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input an index i 
for a time period (throughout, we assume 1 ≤ i ≤ N), the master key SK* and the secret key    of a 
tag. It returns the partial secret key   , for time period i. 
S, the session key generation algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input an index i, 
part of the tag's secret key   
 , and a part of the partial secret key   
 . It returns a shared session 
secret key ski for time period i. 
U, the tag key-update algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input an index i, part of 
the tag's secret key   
  , a part of the partial secret key   
  , and a random   
 . It returns the tag's secret 
key     for time period i + 1 (and erases   ,   ,   
 ). 
Auth(AuthT/AuthS), the authentication message verification algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm for 
a server (resp. tag) which takes as input AuthT(resp. AuthS). It returns 1 or the special symbol ⊥. 
AuthT/AuthS is as follows: 
   - AuthT/AuthS, the Tag (resp. Server) authentication message generation algorithm, is a 
probabilistic algorithm for a tag (resp. server) which takes as input a shared secret ski, a time period i, 
and random numbers   
 and   
 (or xrand) (  
 ,   ,   
 (or xrand), and   
  are the inputs for the server). It 
returns   
 (resp. σi). 
 
KIMAP is used as one might expect. A server begins by generating (SK*, k1) ←G(1
λ, n), storing SK*on a 
server (physically-secure device), and storing k1inboth the server and the tag. At the beginning of 
time period i, the tag requests   = U*(i, SK*,   ) from the server. Using   , and   , the tag may 
compute the session secret key ski= S(i,   
 ,   
 ). This key is used to create authentication messages 
sent during time period i. Both the tag and server update their shared secret by     = U(i,   
  ,  
  ,  
 ). 
After computation of     , the tag must erase   , and   . 
 
2.5 Security Definitions 
 
Adversary A's interaction with the RFID entities in the network is modeled by sending the following 
queries to an oracle O and receiving the result from O. The queries in our model follow [12] with 
some differences. We do not need Reply*/Execute*, since we do not consider a tag to be maintaining 
an internal state in our protocol. Also, we consider server and reader as a single entity. So, we do not 
need Forward1/Forward2and Auth queries. Instead, Reply, Reply' perform the tasks of Forward1, 
Forward2, respectively. They also serve the purpose of Auth(AuthT/AuthS). 
  --- Query(S,   
 ): It calls server (S) and outputs   
 of period i. 
  --- Query'(  
 ,   
 ): It calls tag ( l) and outputs   
  of period i. 
  --- Queryb (S, x
rand): It calls server (S) and outputs any random xrand. 
  --- Reply(S,  
 ,σi,δi): It calls S with input   
 and outputs σi, δi for period i. It uses AuthS algorithm. The 
output is forwarded to  l. 
  ---Reply'(  
 ,   
 , σi, δi,   
 ): It calls  l with input   
 , σi, δi and outputs   
  for period i. It uses AuthT 
algorithm. The output is forwarded to S. 
  ---Replyb(  
 , xrand, σi, δi ,   
 ): It calls  l with input xrand, σi, δi and outputs   
  for period i. It uses AuthT 
algorithm. The output is forwarded to S. 
  ---Execute(  
 , S): This query uses the algorithms (G, U*, S, U, Auth(AuthT/AuthS)).It receives the 
protocol transcripts σi, δi ,   
 ,   
 ,   
 , and outputs them. This models the adversary A's eavesdropping 
of protocol transcripts. It has the following relationships with the above queries: Execute (  
 , S) = 
Query(S,   
 ) ∧ Query'(  
 ,   
 ) ∧ Reply(S,   
 , σi, δi) ∧ Reply'(  
 ,   
 , σi, δi ,   
 ). 
  --- Executeb(  
 , S): This query uses the algorithms (G, U*, S, U, Auth(AuthT/AuthS)). It receives the 
protocol transcripts σi, δi ,   
 ,   
 ,  rand, and outputs them. This models the adversary A's 
eavesdropping of protocol transcripts except   
  which is used for key update. It has the following 
relationship with the above queries: Executeb(  
 , S) = Queryb(S, xrand) ∧ Query'(  
 ,   
 ) ∧ Reply(S,   
 , σi, 
δi) ∧ Replyb(  
 , xrand, σi, δi ,   
 ). 
  --- RevealSecret ( l, i): This query uses the algorithm U. It receives the tag's  l, and outputs   of 
period i. 
  --- Test ( l, i): This query is allowed only once, at any time during A's execution. A random bit b is 
generated; if b= 1, A is given transcripts corresponding to the tag, and if b = 0, A receives a random 
value. 
 
We now give the definitions through security games, reminiscent of classic indistinguishability in a 
cryptosystem security game. We follow [12] to define indistinguishability and forward security. The 
success of A in the games is subject to A's advantage in distinguishing whether A has received an 
RFID tag's real response or a random value. The next two games represent the attack games for 
forward security and restricted backward security, respectively. 
 
Definition 1.Indistinguishability 
  - Phase 1: Initialization 
    (1) Run algorithm G(1λ, n)  (k1,…, kn). 
    (2) Set each tag  l’s secret key as   , where  l ϵ TS = {  l,…,  n}. 
    (3) Save each  l's    generated in step (1) in Server's field. 
  - Phase 2: Learning 
    (1) Aind executes Query(S,   
 ), Query'(  
 ,   
 ), Reply(S,   
 , σi, δi),Reply'(  
 ,   
 , σi, δi ,   
 ), and 
Execute(  
 , S) oracles for all n-1 tags, except the  c ϵ TS used in challenge phase. 
  - Phase 3: Challenge 
    (1) Aind selects a challenge tag  c from TS. 
    (2) Aind executes Query(S,   
 ), Query'(  
 ,   
 ), Reply(S,   
 , σi,  δi),Reply'(  
 ,   
 , σi, δi ,   
 ), and  
Execute(  
 , S)  oracles for  c, where i = 1,…, q-1. 
    (3) Aind calls the oracle Test( c, i). 
    (4) For the Aind's Test, Oracle O tosses a fair coin b ϵ {0, 1}; let b ←R {0, 1}. 
 i. If b= 1, Aind is given the messages corresponding to  c's i-th instance. 
ii. If b= 0, Aind is given random values. 
(5) Aind outputs a guess bit b’. 
A wins if b= b’ 
The advantage of any PPT adversary Aind with computational boundary e1, r1, r2, λ, where e1 is the 
number of Execute, r1 is the number of Reply, r2 is the number of Reply' and λ is the security 
parameter, is defined as follows: 
AdvAind= |Pr[b= b’] – 1/2| 
The scheme provides indistinguishability if and only if the advantage of AdvAind is negligible. 
 
Definition 2.Forward Security 
  - Phase 1: Initialization 
    (1) Run algorithm G(1
λ
, n)  (k1,…, kn). 
    (2) Set each tag  l s secret key as   , where  l ϵ TS = {  l,…,  n}. 
    (3) Save each  l's    generated in step (1) in Server's field. 
  - Phase 2: Learning 
    (1) Afor executes Query(S,   
 ), Query'(  
 ,   
 ), Reply(S,   
 , σi, δi),Reply'(  
 ,   
 , σi, δi ,   
 ), and 
Execute(  
 , S) oracles for all n-1 tags, except the  c ϵ TS used in challenge phase. 
  - Phase 3: Challenge 
    (1) Afor selects a challenge tag  c from TS. 
    (2) Afor executes Query(S,   
 ), Query'(  
 ,   
 ), Reply(S,   
 , σi, δi),Reply'(  
 ,   
 , σi, δi ,   
 ), and 
Execute(  
 , S) and RevealSecret (  
 , i) oracles for  c for  c’s i-th instance. 
    (3) Afor calls the oracle Test ( c, i-1). 
    (4) For the Afor's Test, Oracle O tosses a fair coin b ϵ {0, 1}; let b ←R {0, 1}. 
      i. If b= 1, Afor is given the messages corresponding to  c's (i-1)-th instance. 
     ii. If b= 0, Afor is given random values. 
    (5)Afor executes the oracles for n-1 tags of TS, except  c, like in the learning phase. 
    (6) Afor outputs a guess bit b’. 
    A wins if b= b’ 
The advantage of any PPT adversary Afor with computational boundary e1, r1, r2, λ, where e1 is the 
number of Execute, r1 is the number of Reply, r2 is the number of Reply' and λ is the security 
parameter, is defined as follows: 
AdvAfor= |Pr[b= b’] – 1/2| 
The scheme is forward secure if and only if the advantage of AdvAfor is negligible. 
 
Definition 3.Restricted Backward Security 
  - Phase 1: Initialization 
    (1) Run algorithm G(1
λ
, n)  (k1,…, kn). 
    (2) Set each tag  l s secret key as   , where  l ϵ TS = {  l,…,  n}. 
    (3) Save each  l's    generated in step (1) in Server's field. 
  - Phase 2: Learning 
    (1) Aback executes Queryb(S, xrand), Query'(  
 ,   
 ), Reply(S,   
 ; σi, δi), Replyb(  
 , xrand, σi, δi ,        
 ), and 
Executeb(  
 , S) oracles for all n-1 tags, except the  c ϵ TS used in challenge phase. 
  - Phase 3: Challenge 
    (1) Aback selects a challenge tag  c from TS. 
    (2) Aback executes Queryb(S, x
rand), Query'(  
 ,   
 ), Reply(S,   
 , σi, δi),Replyb(  
 , xrand, σi, δi ,   
 ), 
Executeb(  
 , S) and RevealSecret (  
 , i) oracles for  c for  c’s i-th instance. 
    (3) Aback calls the oracle Test ( c; i+1). 
    (4) For the Aback's Test, Oracle O tosses a fair coin b ϵ {0, 1}; let b ←R {0, 1} 
      i. If b= 1, Aback is given the messages corresponding to  c's (i+1)-th instance. 
     ii. If b= 0, Aback is given random values. 
    (5) Aback executes the oracles for n-1 tags of TS, except  c, like in the learning phase. 
    (6) Aback outputs a guess bit b’. 
A wins if b= b’ 
The advantage of any PPT adversary Aback with computational boundary e1, r1, rb, λ, where e1is the 
number of Execute, r1 is the number of Reply, rb is the number of Replyb and λ is the security 
parameter, is defined as follows: 
AdvAback= |Pr[b= b’] – 1/2| 
The scheme is restricted backward secure if and only if the advantage of AdvAback is negligible. 
 
A note on restricted backward security: Since once obtaining the tag secret by RevealSecret, Aback 
takes all the power of the tag itself and thus can trace the target tag at least during the 
authentication immediately following the attack. In typical RFID system environments, tags and 
readers operate only at short communication range and for a relatively short period of time. Thus, 
the minimum restriction for backward security is such that the adversary misses the protocol 
transcripts needed to update the compromised secret key. The same restriction was applied in [26]. 
On the other hand, [14] claimed that there should exist some non-empty gap not accessible by the 
adversary between the time of a reveal query and the attack time. But this restriction was shown to 
be inadequate to provide backward security by [20]. 
 
Definition 4.Privacy-Preserving Protocol 
A protocol is privacy-preserving when indistinguishability, forward security, and restricted backward 
security are guaranteed for any PPT adversary A with computational boundary e1, r1, e2, r2, rb, λ, where 
e1 is the number of Execute, r1 is the number of Reply, e2 is the number of Executeb, r2 is the number 
of Reply', rb is the number of Replyb and λ is the security parameter. 
 
 
3 Protocol Description 
 Table 2 describes the protocol building blocks, and Fig. 1 describes the authentication session. During 
any session i, the following steps take place between a tag and a server: 
         1. The server sends a random challenge   
  to the tag. 
         2. The tag replies to the server with a random   
 . 
         3. The server splits   into   
  and   
  , and   
  into   
  and   
   . It then generates   from SK* and 
  by Hi(SK*, ki), where Hi is the i-th time run for H. SK* is used to generate   so that no other 
entities other than a valid server can generate   . Even if an adversary compromises ki, it cannot 
generate  for any subsequent sessions using only that   .   
  is used as a random number for 
server authentication, and   is used as the partial key for the present session. The server computes 
σi= H(  
 ||  ,   
 ||  
 ), and δi= ki xi. The server sends σi and δi to the tag. 
         4. After receiving σi and δi, the tag splits   into   
  and   
  , and extracts    from δi. The tag 
then authenticates the server by verifying σi. If the server is authenticated as a legitimate server, the 
tag splits   
  into   
  and   
   , and   into   
  and   
  . The tag now computes the session secret key ski 
by concatenating   
 and   
 . It then computes   
 = H(  
 ||  
 , ski), and updates its own secret key to      
by H(  
  ||  
  ,   
 ). The tag sends   
  to the server, and erases   ,   
 , and ski from its memory. The 
updated      is used for the next authentication session. 
         5. After the server receives   
 , it authenticates the tag by verifying   
 . Theserver then updates 
the secret key to      of the tag by H(  
  ||  
  ,   
 ). This updated      is stored in the server database, 
and is used for the next authentication session. 
 
A note on possible timing attack: Note that it is imperative for the respective times taken by authentication 
success and failure to be as close as possible to prevent obvious timing attacks by malicious readers (aimed at 
distinguishing among the two cases)[29]. For this reason, even if the authentication by a tag is failed, it should 
generate random numbers instead of simply failure, to make the cases of success and failure indistinguishable 
from each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
4 Evaluation 
 
4.1 Security Analysis 
 
We use a proof method similar to that described in [13, 12]. Even though the protocol in our model 
and that in [13, 12] are different, a similar proof can be used because both are based on the 
impossibility of distinguishing any two values. Before stating the theorems, we introduce the 
following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1.Let L = x y, where x, y ϵ {0, 1}k. L is fixed. Then there exist 2k pairs of (x, y) such that L = 
x y. 
 
Proof : For    ϵ {0, 1}k, x is defined as x= L y.We assume that  (x, y), (x’, y) where x x’, L = x y, and 
L = x’ y. Then y =L x = L x’ x = x’. Therefore,    ϵ {0, 1}k,  1z ϵ {0, 1}ksuch that L = x y. □  
 
Theorem 1.The protocol π= (G, U*, S, U, Auth(AuthT/AuthS) provides indistinguishability for any PPT 
adversary Aind with computational boundary e1, r1, r2, λ, where e1 is the number of Execute, r1 is the 
number of Reply, r2 is the number of Reply' and λ is the security parameter. 
 
Proof: 
Let us define simulators Simexe, SimQue,SimQue’, SimRep, and SimRep’for Tc in the indistinguishability game. 
These simulators do not know the value of b or any secret key kc or skc for Tc. Aind's interaction with 
the simulators will be computationally indistinguishable from an interaction with Tc. Therefore, we 
suppose that Aind does not gain knowledge from its interaction with Tc in a real RFID system. 
Aind chooses challenge tag Tc. Let L be the full list of real quintuplets (rn1, opv, hv1, rn2, hv2) output by 
Tc during the challenge phase of the game, where hva means a hashed value for a = 1, 2, rnbis a 
random number for b= 1, 2 and opv means one-time pad value. During the challenge phase, Simexe 
simulates the result of an Execute call to Tc by generating quintuplet (  
 ,   
 =     ,   
 = H(  
 ||  , 
  
 ||  
 ),   
 ,   
  =H(  
 ||  
 , ski)) for i ≤ # Execute= e1 and appending it to a list L’. 
L’ is empty at the beginning of the challenge phase and N-1 = e1, where N-1 indicates the maximum 
number of queries executed by Aind for Tc's instance. In addition to any valid tag quintuplets output 
by Simexe, Server includes any quintuplet in L’. In order for Aind to distinguish between the simulated 
challenge phase and a real challenge phase, Aind must be able to determine that some quintuplet (xs, 
       , xt,   
 
) ϵ L’is invalid for Tc. To determine this, Aind must identify a quintuplet (xs,    =H(  ||   
  ||  ,   =   ,   ,     =H(  ||  , sk)) that is valid for Tc, but such that, σ ≠   , ≠   , and σ ≠  
 
. 
That is, Aind has to remove an invalid (  ,    ,    ,   ,   
 
) from L’ to show that the correct Simexe is 
present. 
At some point in the course of the challenge phase, one of the following cases must occur: 
1. There is a random pair (xs, xt) s.t. (xs,         , xt ,   
 
) ϵ L’ and (xs,  , σ, xt,   ) ϵ L for some pair 
(X,Y), where X=(   ,    ,  
 
) ϵ L’, Y= ( , σ,   ) ϵ L and σ ≠   ,  ≠   , and σ ≠  
 
. Since Aindmay make 
at most e1Execute calls to Tc, we haveMin(#Execute, |L|)= e1, where #Execute= e1and |L|= N -1. 
As xs, xtare random λ-bit values, and thus the space of random numbers is 22
λ
, it follows that this 
condition occurs with probability at most   
 =22λ. 
2. For a pair (xs, xt) ϵ L’,L, Ainddirectly computes  , σ,   that are equal to Xor Y . There exist 2λpairs 
(y, y’) such that αi= y y’from Lemma 1.Let (y, y’) ϵ {0, 1}
λ×{0, 1}λbe the random values guessed 
by Aindas chosensecrets. Therefore, the success probability of Aindto choose (x, k) pair from  is 
 e12/2
λ = e1/2
λ-1, which is negligible given that e1Execute queries are called, and e1is small 
compared to 2λ-1. 
Moreover, since    = H(k’||x, xs||xt), and   
 
= H(xt||xs, sk) = H(xt||xs, k’||x’),Aindfirst must be able to find 
out k’or x. At this time, the probability of recovering k’ from H(k’||x; xs||xt) is approximately 
e1=2
λ/2provided that e1is small compared to 2
λ/2, and given that e1Execute queries are called. 
Probability of randomly choosing the other part k’’is e1/2
λ/2. So, the probability to guess the correct 
kis   
 /2λ. Again, the probability of recovering x’ or k0from H(xt||xs, sk) = H(xt||xs; k’||x’) is   e1/2
λ/2. So, 
the probability of guessing x or k is   
 /2λ. 
Therefore, Aind can distinguish Simexe from Tc with probability at most   
 /22λ+ e1/2
λ-1+   
 /2λ, which is 
negligible for polynomially bounded Aind. 
Now, during the challenge phase, SimQue, SimQue’ simulate the result of Query and Query' calls to Tc 
and S by generating random numbers  ̃ 
 ,  ̃ 
 for i≤ #Query=#Query'= q-1 and appending them to a list 
M0. 
SimRep, SimRep’ simulate the result of a Reply and Reply' call to Tc, respectively. While SimRep generates 
( ̃  = H(k’j||xj,  ̃ 
 || ̃ 
 ),  ̃ = xj kj) for j ≤#Reply=r1=q -1and appends it to a list M1, Sim
Rep’ generates 
( ̃  =H(skm;  ̃ 
 k ̃ 
 )) for m ≤#Reply'=r2=q -1 and appends it to a list M2. To simplify the analysis, here 
we assume that the results of SimQue, SimQue’ influence the simulated results of SimRep and SimRep’.This 
is because  ̃ 
 , ̃ 
 output by SimQue, SimQue’ are included in the computation of  ̃= H(k’||x,  ̃ || ̃ ), ̃ = 
H(sk,  ̃ || ̃ ) of SimRep and SimRep’, where  ̃ 
 = xs and  ̃ 
 = xt. Of course, we can consider that the 
random numbers are independent in σ, σ’ which causes the complicated analysis. 
Recall that Aind selects the challenge tag Tc from the unrevealed tags, and L is the full list of 
quintuplets (rn1, opv, hv1, rn2, hv2) output by T
c during the challenge phase of the game. Note that 
M0,M1,M2are empty at the beginning of the challenge phase. In order for A
ind to distinguish between 
the simulated challenge phase and a real phase, Aind must determine that some quadruplet ( ̃ ,  ̃,  ̃, 
 ̃ ) ϵ M1is invalid for Tc. To determine this, Aind must identify a quadruplet (xs,δ= k x,σ= H(k’||x, xs||xt), 
xt) that is valid for Tc, but such that δ≠ ̃ and σ≠ ̃, to show that SimRep is present. 
Consequently, one of the following two cases must occur at some point in the course of the 
challenge phase of the game. 
1. There are random numbers xs,xt such that ( ̃ ,  ̃,  ̃,  ̃ ) ϵ M1and (xs, δ, σ, xt) ϵ L for some pair 
(X, Y ), where X = ( ̃,  ̃) ϵ M1and Y   = (δ, σ) ϵ L: Since Aind may execute at most r1Reply calls 
to Tc, we have Min(#Reply; |L|) = r1, where #Reply= r1and |L|= q  -1. As x
s, xt are random λ-bit 
values, and thus the space of random numbers is 22λ, it follows that this case occurs with 
probability at most r21/2
2λ
. 
2. For random numbers xs,xt ϵ M1,L, Aind computes the values corresponding to X or Y  : Since σ= 
H(k’||x, xs||xt), Aind must know (x, k) and (xs, xt) to compute σ corresponding to X or Y . Given 
that at most r1Replyqueries are called, the probability of recovering (x, k) is r1/2
λ
. Again, for a 
pair (xs, xt) ϵ M1,L, Aind directly computes δ that is equal to X  or Y . There exist 2
λpairs (y, y’) 
such that αi= y y’from Lemma 1. Let (y, y’) ϵ {0, 1}
λ×{0, 1}λ be the random values guessed by 
Aind as chosen secrets. Therefore, the success probability of Aind to choose (x, k) pair from δ 
is  r12/2
λ
= r1/2
λ-1
, which is negligible given that r1Reply queries are called, and r1is small 
compared to 2λ-1.  
Therefore, Aind can distinguish SimRep from Tc with probability at most r21/2
λ+ r1/2
λ+ r1/2
λ-1, which is 
negligible for polynomial bounded Aind.  
Similarly, Aind can distinguish SimRep’ from Tc with probability at most r22/2
λ+ r2/2
λ, which is negligible 
for polynomial bounded Aind. ■ 
 
Theorem 2.The protocol π= (G, U*, S, U, Auth(AuthT/ AuthS) is forward secure for any PPT adversary 
Afor with computational boundary e1, r1, r2, λ, where e1is the number of Execute, r1is the number of 
Reply, r2is the number of Reply' and λ is the security parameter. 
 
Proof: 
In the challenge phase, Afor makes e1Execute calls for each tag of (n  -1) tags except Tc, as in the 
learning phase. At this time, let Afor's advantage for recovering Ti's secret key ki be Adv
Rec
Afor,Ti(λ) from 
the collected transactions of Execute queries. In other words, the probability of finding out ki from a 
quintuplet (   ,δi= ki xi,σi= H(ki’||xi, xsi||xti), xti,σi’= H(xti||xsi, ski)) is 1-(1-1/2λ)e1,given e1 Execute queries 
for Ti, and i = 1,…, n -1. 
When Afor is given a random value or Tc's real message in response to Test query, it must be able to 
compute (δc, σc, σc’) corresponding to Tc's (i -1)-th instance to guess correctly, i.e. b≠b’, where δc= 
kc xc, σc= H(kc’||xc, xsc||xtc), σc’=H(xtc||xsc, skc). As the necessary condition, Afor has to recover kc(of (i -1)-
th instance) from i-th instance H(k’’||x’’, xs). Note that, Afor already knows k related to the i-th instance 
with RevealSecret. We now define Afor's advantage in picking k’’ by guessing the correct fair coin bas 
Advfor(λ/2), thus the following is induced: Advfor(λ/2) ≤AdvRecAfor,T1(λ/2) + AdvRecAfor,T2(λ/2) + 
…+AdvRecAfor,Tn-1(λ/2) ≤ (n -1)Adv
Rec
Afor;T1(λ/2) ≤ (n -1){1– (1-1/2
λ/2)e1} (n-1)e1/2
λ/2. Again the probability 
of choosing k’ is   e1/2
λ/2. In total, Afor's advantage in guessing the correct fair coin b is at most (n -
1)e21/2
λ, which is negligible. 
With a similar method, we can show that forward security for Afor is satisfied in KIMAP. When the 
maximum number of Reply and Reply' for (n -1)'s Tc is r1and r2, respectively, the adversary Afor can 
correctly guess b with probability at most (n-1) ∙r1/2
λ/2∙r1/2
λ/2+(n-1) ∙r2/2
λ/2∙r2/2
λ/2+(n-1) ∙r1/2
λ-1=(n -1) 
∙r21/2
λ+ (n -1) ∙r22/2
λ+ r1/2
λ-1, which is negligible for polynomial bounded Afor.■ 
 
Theorem 3.The protocol π= (G, U*, S, U, Auth(AuthT/ AuthS) is restricted backward secure for any 
PPT adversary Aback with computational boundary e2, r1, rb, λ, where e2is the number of Executeb, r1is 
the number of Reply, rb is the number of Replyb and λ is the security parameter. 
 
Proof: 
Assuming that Aback misses the necessary protocol transcripts to update the compromised key, the 
proof for backward security is similar to that of Theorem 2 with the exception that the future secrets 
are secure. 
In the challenge phase, Aback makes e1Executebcalls for each of (n -1)'s tags except Tc, as in the 
learning phase. At this time, let Aback's advantage in recovering Ti's secret key ki be AdvRecAback,Ti(λ) 
from the collected transactions of Executeb queries. In other words, the probability of finding out ki 
from a quintuplet (   ,δi= ki xi,σi= H(ki’||xi, xsi||xti), xti,σi’ = H(xti||xsi, ski)) is 1-(1-1/2λ)e2, given 
e2Executebqueries for Ti, and i = 1,…, n -1. 
When Aback is given a random value or Tc's real message in response to Test query, it must be able to 
compute (δc, σc,σc’) corresponding to Tc's (i+1)-th instance to guess correctly, i.e. b≠b’, where δc= 
kc xc, σc= H(kc’||xc, xsc||xtc), σc’ =H(xtc||xsc, skc). As the necessary condition, Afor has to recover kc (of (i -
1)-th instance) from i-th instance H(k’’||x’’, xs). Note that, Aback already knows k related to the i-th 
instance with RevealSecret but missed the necessary transcript   
 which is used to update k for (i +1)-
th instance. We now define Aback's advantage in guessing the correct fair coin b as Advback(λ), thus the 
following is induced: Advback(λ) ≤Adv
Rec
Aback,T1(λ) + Adv
Rec
Aback,T2(λ) + …+Adv
Rec
Aback,Tn-1(λ) ≤(n -1) 
AdvRecAback,T1(λ) ≤(n -1){1– (1- 1/2
λ
)e1}  (n-1)e1/2
λ
, which is negligible. 
Similarly, we can show that backward security for Aback is satisfied in KIMAP. When the maximum 
number of Reply and Replyb for (n -1)'s T
cis r1and rb, respectively, the adversary A
back can correctly 
compute ki+1 from Reply with probability at most (n-1)∙r21/2
λ+(n-1)∙r1/2
λ-1,and from Replyb with 
probability at most (n-1) ∙r2b/2
λ
 . So, Aback can guess b with probability at most (n-1) ∙r21/2
λ
+(n -1) 
∙r1/2
λ-1+ (n -1) ∙r2b/2
λ, which is negligible for polynomial bounded Aback.■ 
 
Theorem 4.The protocol π= (G, U*, S, U, Auth(AuthT/ AuthS) is privacy-preserving for any PPT 
adversary A with computational boundary e1, e2, r1, r2, rb, λ, where e1 is the number of Execute, e2 is 
the number of Executeb, r1 is the number of Reply, r2 is the number of Reply', rb is the number of 
Replyb and λ is the security parameter. 
 
4.2 Discussion and Comparison with Previous Work 
 
Deursen et al. [33] discussed a weakness of the indistinguishability definition of [12]. Deursen et al. 
argued that, to achieve location privacy, the adversary must not be able to distinguish one tag's 
response from other tags' responses, but it is not necessary that the adversary cannot distinguish the 
tag's response from any arbitrary value. However, our definition can be modified according to their 
argument. For that purpose, the oracle queries should run on all but two tags which are used for the 
challenge phase. All the adversary needs to do is to distinguish between those two tags. In fact, our 
assumption about the tag responses is such that the outputs of the one-way hash functions are 
indistinguishable from a random bit string of equal length. 
In [3], Bellare et al. show that it is impossible to achieve public-channel key insulated security in the 
face of an active adversary (who can compromise the secret key). Although we follow the idea of key 
insulation from [10], assuming passive adversary in case of RFID (who can eavesdrop only) is not 
practical, as it is easy for an adversary to break into a tag's memory. Considering this, the 
assumptions made in our scheme (as well as in [26]) are more realistic to achieve restricted backward 
security and the other features as well. However, many of the existing mutual authentication 
protocols may support restricted backward security under our assumption ([5, 31, 29] to name a few). 
But [5, 31] require a tag to remember too many secrets. Moreover, [5, 31] cannot provide forward 
security as shown by [23] and [35], respectively. Again, [29] requires more computation than our 
scheme, and it does not provide reader authentication. Nevertheless, none of these protocols came 
up with a formal model of backward security (even if not perfect). 
Although it is not the primary target of our proposed protocol, it is also possible to prevent 
desynchronization attacks [32] in our protocol to some extent. We consider the following type of 
attack: If the last message is blocked, the tag updates the shared secret key, ki, but the server 
doesn't. The server and tag are no longer able to communicate successfully. To prevent such an 
attack, the server has to remember the last valid authentication session transcripts and the secret 
values. When a server receives some random number instead of a valid authentication value from a 
tag, the server updates itself using the information from the last valid session, and tries again to get 
synchronized with the tag. Although the question of scalability is an issue here, this approach can 
help avoid such desynchronization attacks in a limited way (of course the system gets desynchronized 
if the last messages from two consecutive sessions are blocked). Even though the system gets 
desynchronized, an adversary cannot trace a tag from its desynchronized state, since the responses of 
a tag are always pseudorandom, hence indistinguishable. However, as discussed in [8], eliminating 
any possibility of desynchronization is difficult on a technical level given the limited functionality of 
low-cost tags. Nevertheless, providing tools for detecting such an attack and localizing the adversarial 
device is not a major issue. In actual systems, the operator would have to physically remove or 
deactivate the attack device. In this paper, we are more concerned with `exposure resilience' of the 
secret key and its effect on the authentication protocol, rather than the desynchronization attacks. 
Providing full resistance against desynchronization attacks is a separate issue. 
Unlike other work mentioned in Section 1.1, we achieve both forward and backward security, along 
with indistinguishability. The keys used for tag authentication in the protocol are different in each 
session for each tag. Unlike MSW protocols, it is not possible in our protocol for an adversary to 
derive secrets of other tags, even if she obtains a tag's secret key since no two tags share any secret 
key. We compare our work, based on security properties and computational cost, with LK and SM 
schemes in Table 3 below. According to [12], a scheme must satisfy both forward security and 
indistinguishability in order to achieve `strong location privacy'. If a scheme satisfies 
indistinguishability only, the scheme is `weak location private'. [25] has shown that SM scheme is not 
forward secure. So, SM scheme is weak location private only, whereas our scheme is strong location 
private. SM scheme furthermore does not give any formal security model for indistinguishability and 
forward security. Regarding computational requirements, our protocol requires a simple one-way 
hash function, random number generation and the XOR operation. We use a simple hash function 
like DM-PRESENT-80 [4] to achieve forward security for the tag. This requires around 2200 gates. 
Assuming that generating random numbers requires the same computational ability as for the hash 
functions, our protocol needs 4 hash operations only. According to Table 3, in KIMAP, a tag requires 
fewer computations compared to the LK and SM schemes. Assuming that a secret key is 64-bits long, 
a tag in the LK scheme requires storing 3 secret keys (192 bits). As the server needs to authenticate 
itself first to a tag, the server must broadcast the authentication messages to the tags. Since the 
server does not know the id of the tag that it wants to authenticate, the server has to compute and 
broadcast the authentication messages for all the tags in its storage. We assume that the server has 
enough resource to perform such computation. On the other hand, a tag receiving the broadcast 
messages has to find a match with its verification value. Although computing the verification value is 
always constant, finding a match increases the required computations according to the number of 
broadcast messages in the worst case. As stated earlier, such a scenario is unavoidable when we 
require that a server should authenticate itself first to a tag. We say that our scheme is more suitable 
for an environment where the reader must read a number of tags at a time (inventory management) 
and/or where there are not too many tags (library with a few thousand books). 
 
 
 
Table 3: Performance Comparison  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 A Quantitative Performance Analysis 
 
In most of the RFID applications, there is a tag reader between tags and the server. For the 
performance analysis, we assume that a reader exists, and it only transfers the message transcripts to 
tag and server. Before making our assumptions and analyzing our schemes, we briefly review some 
facts on practical deployment of an RFID system. 
- Tag readers are assumed to have a secure and dedicated connection to a back-end database. 
Although readers in practice may only read tags from within the short tag operating range, 
the reader-to-tag, or forward channel is assumed to be broadcast with a signal strong 
enough to monitor from long range. The tag-to-reader or backward channel is relatively 
much weaker, and may only be monitored by eavesdroppers within the tag's shorter 
operating range [34]. 
-  The time available for a complete reading/authentication procedure is in the range of 5-10 
milliseconds considering the performance criteria of an RFID system that demands a 
minimum tag reading speed of at least 200 tags per second [8]. 
-  In accordance with EPC C1G2 protocol, a maximum tag-to-reader data transmission rate 
bound of 640 kbps and a reader-to-tag data transmission rate bound of 126 kbps [8]. 
-  In the low-cost tags, the complexity of implementing robust PRNGs is equivalent to the 
complexity of implementing robust one-way hash functions. The same assumption has been 
widely considered in cryptographic literature, [29,17,28] to name a few. 
Our Assumptions: Based on the above facts, we use the following assumptions for the quantitative 
analysis of our schemes. 
-  The tag reading speed is at least 200 tags per second. 
-  The time for a complete reading/authentication procedure is in the range of5-10 
milliseconds. 
Ind.: Indistinguishability; OK: Scheme Satisfies The Feature; X: Scheme Does Not Satisfy The  
Feature; XOR: Bitwise XOR operation; * Each secret is 128 bits 
Feature
s Schemes
s 
-  The tag-to-reader data transmission rate bound is 640 kbps and a reader-to-tag data 
transmission rate bound is 126 kbps. 
-  Computing a PRNG and a one-way hash function takes same time. 
-  DM-PRESENT-80 hash function is used as the underlying one-way hash function. It provides 
64-bit security level, and operates in a single block with 33 cycles per block at the rate of 100 
khz. Each of the hash function takes 33/100khz = 0.33 milliseconds to run on a tag. 
-  The time required for XOR and concatenation operations is ignored, since they take 
negligible amount of time and resource. 
-  Computation time in reader and the server is ignored since reader and server have ample 
computational power. 
Quantitative Performance: Our protocol requires 4 hash operations for a tag, thus taking 1.32 
milliseconds. The tag-to-reader communication requires128-bits, so it will take 128bits/640kbps= 0.20 
milliseconds. Similarly, the reader-to-tag communication takes 1.52 milliseconds. In total, our 
estimated total protocol execution time is: (1.32 + 0.20 + 1.52)  3.0 milliseconds, which is well within 
the requirement as stated above. Assuming that 200 tags are read at one time in case of batch-mode 
environment (i.e., where many tags are authenticated at once), the estimated run times of our 
protocols are well within the bound. As for the required number of gates, our protocols are also well 
within the requirements for the low-cost tags, which are expected to have 2000-5000 gates available 
for security purposes [8]. 
Most RFID readers have serial interfaces using RS/EIA 232 standards (point to point, twisted pair)[11]. 
Readers communicate with the back-end server using such an interface. RS 232 serial interface 
standard says that the bit rate is lower than 20,000 bits per second [27]. As per our assumption, when 
200 tags are read at a time in the batch-mode, it would take 25600-bits to be transferred, requiring 
around 1.28 sec to transfer the data. In the case of reading a single tag, the data transfer would take 
128bits/20000bps = 6.40 milliseconds. This amount of time for protocol execution is well within the 
capability of today's RFID systems. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
We have proposed KIMAP, a privacy-preserving mutual RFID authentication protocol for shared key 
environment. The protocol uses two different keys for mutual authentication. The server sends a 
random partial key (generated from a master secret key SK*) to a tag. The tag generates the session 
key sk to authenticate itself to the server. The tag's secret key k is updated using a partial key 
received from the server. As k is purely fresh for every time period, the tag's security is guaranteed 
for all other time periods (both for the past and future) under our assumptions. We show that our 
scheme is computationally more efficient than the SM and LK schemes. Our protocol satisfies 
indistinguishability, and achieves both forward and restricted backward security through key-
insulation. We provide a formal security model of the proposed protocol as well. 
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